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This research examines the impact of the corporate governance structure (CEO duality, CEO 
Gender, gender diversity, Independent Director, Audit Committee Independency and Risk 
Committee) on the performance of the Malaysian public listed companies in terms of return on 
assets and return on equity. In this research, secondary data from the annual reports were used to 
study the effect of each corporate governance variables on the performance of the Malaysian public 
listed companies. The data had undergone descriptive analysis, correlative analysis, reliability 
analysis and Ordinary Least Square analysis to determine their relationships. The research found 
that the corporate governance variables overall have no significant impact to explain the 
performance of the listed companies after the MCCG was revised. It suggests future researchers 
to explore into other factors that could possibly affect the company performance. 
Keywords: ceo duality, ceo gender, gender diversity, independent director, audit committee 

























Kajian ini mengkaji kesan struktur tadbir urus korporat (duality CEO, Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif 
Gender, kepelbagaian jantina, Pengarah Bebas, Jawatankuasa Audit dan Jawatankuasa Risiko) 
mengenai prestasi syarikat tersenarai awam Malaysia dari segi pulangan aset dan pulangan ke atas 
ekuiti. Dalam kajian ini, data sekunder dari laporan tahunan digunakan untuk mengkaji kesan 
setiap pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat terhadap prestasi syarikat tersenarai awam Malaysia. 
Data tersebut telah mengalami analisis deskriptif, analisis korelatif, analisis kebolehpercayaan dan 
analisis regresi ordinary least square untuk menentukan hubungan mereka. Penyelidikan 
mendapati bahawa pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat secara keseluruhan tidak mempunyai kesan 
yang ketara untuk menjelaskan prestasi syarikat tersenarai selepas MCCG disemak semula. Ia 
mencadangkan para penyelidik masa depan untuk meneroka faktor-faktor lain yang mungkin 
menjejaskan prestasi syarikat. 
Kata kunci: ceo dualiti, jantina ceo, kepelbagaian jantina, pengarah bebas, jawatankuasa audit 
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                         CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The first chapter will explain on the background of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
There are seven sections in first chapter. Firstly, this chapter will be discussed on the 
background of study to give a view of Corporate Governance in Malaysia. Next, this 
chapter will present the problem statement, Research Objectives and Questions. Lastly, this 
chapter also cover the significant and scope and limitation of the study. 
1.2 Background of Study 
Corporate Governance was described as the process to supervise the business of the 
company by strengthen business profitability and corporate credibility with the conclusive 
objective. Besides, corporate governance considered the interest of other stakeholders 
while taking long-term shareholder value into account (MCCG,2012). Corporate 
governance is created to secure shareholders as well as stakeholders and give proper firm 
management (Mollah, Farooque, and Karim 2012). The existence of asymmetric 
information and less perfect contractual relations creates conflict between two parties 
which are the managers and shareholders because managers tend to have inducement to 
prioritize their own objectives (Farhat, 2014). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) introduced agency theory which explained on how corporate governance 
and firm profitability relationship. The manager’s decision determined the firm 
performance and shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, control of agency problem during the 




effects of their decisions.  (Fama and Jensen,1983).Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that 
managerial ownership aligned the interest of the owners’ and managers’ interest because 
managerial ownership makes the manager work as the owner in the organization. Thus, the 
manager will concentrated on maximized the firm performance. Besides, Panda and Leepsa 
(2017) stated that agency theory was introduced to discuss the problem that may surface 
due to owners and managers work for their self-interest.  
During 1997, Malaysia was affected by the Asian Financial Crisis which is started in 
Thailand as a result in Thailand Baht devaluation. The cause of the devaluation of 
Thailand's baht was because when the result of the Thai government no longer peg the 
Thailand bath to the U.S. dollar (USD). Thai government was forced to allow the rate of 
exchanged to be set by the market and the Central Bank involve in the rate of exchanged 
in order to defend their respective currencies. The devaluation of Thai currency has given 
effect to Malaysia. Malaysia stock price plummeted drastically to 52 percent. One of reason 
that Malaysia also affected by the crisis probably was because Malaysia still did not has 
corporate governance during that time (Arif, 2005). Due to this incident, the policy makers 
recognize the value of good and powerful culture of corporate governance in a country was 
important.  
Malaysia regulators create a guideline or recommendation on how the company should 
govern. Thus, the MCCG was introduced in 2000 to strengthen the framework of the 
corporate governance in Malaysia by creating principles and perfect practices (MCCG, 
2000). MCCG was developed by the JPK1 that consist of a combination of private and 
public sector that was led by the Chairman of Federation of Public Committee on Corporate 




which are prescriptive approach, non-prescriptive approach and hybrid approach (Hampel 
approach) (MCCG, 2007).  The Committee observed that hybrid approach was the most 
suitable for Malaysia. Hampel approach was design on 1998 considered in broad principles 
and common sense was required to apply in different circumstances of individual 
companies. The MCCG 2000 is internationally recognized which are above and beyond 
the minimum required by Bursa Malaysia and has influenced the corporate governance in 
the firm positively (MCCG, 2017). 
In 2007, the regulator revised the MCCG to focus in the roles of the audit committee and 
directors. In comparison to MCCG 2000, MCCG 2007 provides enhancement by 
encourage that meetings between the audit committee and the external auditor should be 
more than before. Beside external auditor, audit committee also should constantly meeting 
with the senior management of the company. Furthermore, MCCG 2007 also included that 
all companies required to have an internal audit function. The enhancement indicates 
MCCG believes that the audit committee quality play important roles in corporate 
governance. 
Later in 2012, new MCCG was released by the regulators to replace MCCG 2017 which 
was MCCG 2012 that have eight (8) principles. The principles was the guidance for the 
Malaysian companies so that it is applicable and aligned with globally that are 
acknowledge as the best practices and standards. MCCG 2012 outline 26 recommendations 
that focused in clarifying the responsibility of the board of director in contributing 
leadership and boosting board productiveness through strengthening the composition. The 





Principle 1: Establish clear roles and responsibilities  
Principle 2: Strengthen composition  
Principle 3: Reinforce independence  
Principle 4: Foster commitment  
Principle 5: Uphold integrity in financial reporting  
Principle 6: Recognize and manage risks  
Principle 7: Ensure timely and high quality disclosure 




Key Features of MCCG 2017 
Source: MCCG, 2017 
In 2017, the MCCG, takes on a new perspective, which are Comprehend, Apply and Report 




internalization than before. Firstly, the company need to understand the spirit and purpose 
beyond the principles and practices including its purpose of results. Next, company need 
to apply the practices stated in corporate governance to achieve and support the intended 
outcome in building a best corporate governance. Lastly, company need to report 
disclosure on the corporate governance in annual report. MCCG 2017 involved in the 
switch of comply or explain to apply or explain an alternative.  
Besides, MCCG 2017 also outlines several step ups to provide significant explanation on 
how the company should applied the practices in the company management. One of the 
step ups in the MCCG 2017 including the board has a policy which limits the tenure of its 
independent directors. The directors could incumbency as independent director up to nine 
years. The next step up is the companies are encouraged to fully disclose the detailed 
remuneration of each member of senior management on a named basis and the Audit 
Committee should comprise solely of Independent Directors. Last but not least, a Risk 
Management Committee should be established by the company. Majority of the committee 
of must be comprises of independent directors to supervise the company’s risk 
management framework and policies (MCCG 2017).  
MCCG 2017 practice three (3) principles which are Board Leadership and Effectiveness, 
Effective Audit and Risk Management, and Integrity in Corporate Reporting and 
Meaningful Relationship with Stakeholders. Under board leadership and effectiveness, the 
leader of the board is a person responsible for achieving the aim of the company. In order 
to achieve board effectiveness, the chairman of the board cannot hold the position of the in 




accountability and facilitates division of responsibilities between them. In addition, the 
board should set the clarity board, its committees and individual directors.  
Second principle highlight that the audit committee independency is effective to 
objectively review the finding and recommendation during the Audit Committee’s 
meeting. In addition, MCCG 2017 also pointed that the Audit Committee’s Chairman is 
not the same person hold the position of the company. This is because, if the chairman can 
be independent director. For the risk management principle, a Risk Management 
Committee should be established by the company. Majority of the committee of must be 
comprises of independent directors because independent director supervised the 
company’s risk based on independent judgement since they do not have any share in the 
company compare to the non-independent director. 
Lastly, under integrity in corporate reporting and meaningful relationship with 
stakeholders, the company need to conduct a general meeting and to make sure the 
participation of management. The purpose of the meeting is to make sure that the 
stakeholders apprehend the company’s business and to inform the stakeholder about the 
performance of the business. Thus, the company and stakeholders could gain mutual 









Table 1.1  
Comparison between MCCG 2012 and MCCG 2017  
 MCCG 2012 MCCG 2017 
Tenure of its 
independent 
directors 
The tenure of an independent 
director should not exceed a 
cumulative term of nine years. 
Upon completion of the nine 
years, an independent director 
may continue to serve on the 
board subject to the director’s re-
designation as a non-independent 
director. 
The board must justify and seek 
shareholders’ approval in the 
event it retains as an independent 
director, a person who has served 
in that capacity for more than 
nine years. 
After a cumulative term of 9 
years, an independent director 
may continue to serve on the 
board as a non-independent 
director. However, if the board 
intends to retain an independent 
director beyond 9 years, it should 
provide justification and seek 
annual shareholders’ approval.  
 
If the board continues to retain 
the independent director after 
year-12, the board should provide 
justification and seek annual 
shareholders’ approval through a 








None Companies are encouraged to 
fully disclose the detailed 
remuneration 
of each member of senior 
management on a named basis. 
Audit 
committee 
None The Audit Committee should 
comprise solely of Independent 
Directors. The Chairman of the 
Audit Committee is not the 




None Board establishes a Risk 
Management Committee which 
comprises a majority of 
independent directors to oversee 
the company’s risk management 
framework and policies 
Women 
directors 
None For Large Companies, the board 





The positions of chairman and 
CEO should be held by different 
individuals, and the chairman 
must be a non-executive member 
of the board. 
The positions of Chairman and 







Table 1.1 (Continued) 
 MCCG 2012 MCCG 2017 
Independent 
Directors 
The board must comprise a 
majority of independent directors 
where the chairman of the board 
is not an independent director. 
At least half of the board 
comprises independent directors. 
For Large Companies, the board 
comprises a majority independent 
directors. 
Practice Principle 1: Establish clear roles 
and responsibilities  
Principle 2: Strengthen 
composition  
Principle 3: Reinforce 
independence  
Principle 4: Foster commitment  
Principle 5: Uphold integrity in 
financial reporting  
Principle 6: Recognize and 
manage risks  
Principle 7: Ensure timely and 
high quality disclosure 
Principle 8: Strengthen 
relationship between company 
and shareholders 
Principle A: Board Leadership 
and Effectiveness 
Principle B: Effective Audit and 
Risk Management 
Principle C: Integrity in 
Corporate Reporting and 

















1.3 Problem Statement 
MCCG was derived from the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
Hampel Report (1998) (Haniffa and Hudaif, 2006). It was introduced in 2000 and was 
revised in 2007, 2012 and 2017 to enhance the ideal practices of corporate governance 
code. The increasing occurrence of corporate scandals and failure has risen a question 
whether the current corporate governance mechanisms practically to prevent scandals and 
failure from happen (Alabede, 2016).  A poor governance in companies could come with 
great loss to the entire economy in the form of huge expenditure to rescue the companies 
(Kallamu, 2016).  
Corporate governance focus on companies and their shareholders, or within broader 
definitions that include the accountability of companies to many other stakeholders (Farhat, 
2014). Xiang (2018) studied on corporate governance structure and firm performance of 
Malaysian public listed companies found that the firm performance (ROE) of 2012 and 
2016 show a decrement from 0.2061 to 0.1944 respectively. Besides, Kana (2019) stated 
that the total earnings of Bursa Malaysia’s 30 stocks for the year 2018 were dropped by 
18.14% compared to the year 2017.  
According to by Noor and Iskandar (2012), failure in controlling corporate credit risk may 
lead a company to face a financial distress that resulted in losses to stockholders, creditors 
and employees. In Malaysia, financial distress companies that fail to meet minimum capital 
(not less than 25percent of the paid up capital) is often associated with the PN17 status 




One of Malaysia’s largest financial scandals was 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) 
wholly owned by the government.  Initially, the Malaysia’s state-owned investment fund, 
1MDB, was supposed to invite foreign investor (Randeep Ramesh, 28 Jul 2016,) and 
promote economic development in Malaysia where the median income stands range is 
RM1,500 per month (Shamim Adam, Laurence Arnold and Yudith Ho, 24 May 2018). It 
was set up in 2009 by the Malaysia’s sixth prime minister, Datuk Seri Najib bin Tun Abdul 
Razak. In 2015, he was accused to channel over RM 2.67 billion (nearly USD 700 million) 
from the fund into his account. The 1MDB scandal fueled the voter backlash which led to 
Najib ousted from power and ended the party’s that rule Malaysia for 61 years.  
Consequently, due to lack of strict corporate governance practice in firm, it has hit the 
confidence of investors. This urged the policy makers to create more measurement in 
corporate governance to reduce the misgovern problems in the firm. 
The aim of the study are to study the impact of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG, 2017) on the performance (ROA and ROE) of Malaysian public listed companies 
and examine the relationship of corporate governance and the performance of the listed 
companies in Malaysia. With the result of the study, the regulators could know whether the 
revised version of MCCG give positive impact to the firm performance. Besides, they can 








1.4 Research Objectives 
1) To study the impact of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2017) on 
the performance (ROA and ROE) of Malaysian public listed companies 
2) To examine the relationship of corporate governance and the performance (ROA and 
ROE)  of the listed companies in Malaysia. 
1.5 Research Questions 
1) What is the impact of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2017) 
on the performance (ROA and ROE) of Malaysian public listed companies? 
2) What is the relationship of corporate governance and the performance of the listed 
















1.6 Significant of the Study 
1.6.1 Regulators 
First and foremost, the outcomes of the study may contribute to the regulators. In sight of 
MCCG 2012 and MCCG 2017, the outcome of the study will provide information on the 
improvement made by each MCCG and the effect of it on the performance (ROA and ROE) 
of Malaysian companies. This study will allows regulators to recognize the independent 
variables that impact the firm value after the revise code (2017). Moreover, the some of the 
independent variable maybe insignificant to explain the firm profitability. The regulators 
can use this information to improve the revise corporate governance. 
1.6.2 Investors 
The aim of good corporate governance is to create a balance of power-sharing among 
shareholders, directors, and management to enhance shareholder value and protect the 
interests of other stakeholders. An effective corporate governance structure improves 
investor confidence because it ensures corporate accountability, enhances the reliability 
and quality of public financial information, and enhances the integrity and efficiency of the 
capital market. The study will provide an additional information to the investor on how the 
management of corporate government in Malaysia. Therefore, foreign investor’s 
confidence level to invest in Malaysia based on how company manage their corporate 






1.6.3 Academic Researches 
This study helps researchers to understand the MCCG 2017. None of the past research has 
studies on the impact of MCCG 2017 on the performance (ROA and ROE) of Malaysian 
public listed companies. Previously, Bhatt and Bhatt (2017) studied the impact on MCCG 
2007 and 2012 on the performance of the listed companies in Malaysia. Therefore, future 

















1.7 Scope and Limitation 
The data were collected by this study from 2016 until 2018 from the annual report of the 
company that were downloaded in the Bursa Malaysia website. The variables were 
collected from the financial statement, income statement, Board of Director Information 
and Corporate Governance Report. The data were divided into two section that was before 
the revision and after the revision.  
There are a few constraint during carrying this research. Firstly, there is limited time to 
carry the study since only three months are given to carry the study. The data for after the 
MCCG was revised should cover 2018 and 2019, however, the annual report for 2019 did 
not has in the Bursa since it has not been published.  
There are 920 companies that are listed in Malaysia. Companies on Bursa Malaysia are 
listed under either the Main or ACE Markets. Out of 920 companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia, 792 companies are listed under Main Market while 128 companies under the 
ACE Market. The study only cover 90 companies which are randomly selected that are 
listed under the Main Markets. Roscoe (1975) suggested the rule of thumb stated that 
sample size should be larger than 30 and smaller than 500 and at least 10 percent from the 
population size. Thus, with a population of 792 public listed companies in Main Market, a 
sample size of 90 public listed companies or 11.36% of the population is adequate for this 
study. For better and accurate result, the data should involve all 792 company. Moreover, 
the study only discuss the association whole sample but not by sector. Therefore, future 




Last but not least, we only used Multiple Regression Model to identify the association 
between the corporate governance and firm performance. There could be others model that 























Chapter 2 will provide on the literatures of this study. First part presents the relevant 
theoretical theory and subsequently a review of relevant literatures.  
2.1 Relevant Theoretical Theory 
2.1.1 Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 
Agency theory concerning problems when the owner of the company and the manager had 
different goals that they want to achieve (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Various governance 
mechanisms were implemented to reduce the cost of the agency theory. Under this theory, 
a principal (shareholder) makes an agreement with the agent (managers and directors) to 
create a value resulting from the business. As such, agent (managers and directors) need to 
report to the principal (shareholder) about the progress business because principal need to 








Source: Saltaji, I. M. (2013). Corporate governance and agency theory how to control 
agency costs. Internal Audit & Risk Management, 4(32), 47-60.  
According to Ronen & Balachandran (1995), agency theory assumed that fulfillment of the 
task delegated by the principal requires an effort of actions which can cause harmful to the 
agent when carried out over a long period.  Agency problem arise when agents diverge 
from that of the principal agency theory to serve their own self-interest and principal did 
not monitor the performance of agent (Ronen & Balachandran, 1995). Arrow (1971) and 
Wilson (1968) explained that one of the agency problem raised in a firm was the risk-
sharing between the agent and principal. The principal invest their capital and take risk 
averse to gain the economic benefits hired the agent to manage the risk and maximizing 
the economics benefits. Both party has opposite risk preferences that may lead to the agent 
maximizing their own private benefits instead of maximizing the principal economics 




The main factor that cause the agency cost is the divergence of the objective of managers 
and shareholders which can be resolve by effective monitoring to improve firm 
performance (Bhatt and Bhatt, 2017). Previous study has highlighted the agency issue that 
may arise in different fields like finance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983), political 
science (Hammond & Knott, 1996), accounting (Ronen & Balachandran, 1995) and 
economics (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). According to agency theory, the more 
the independent director, the better the performance of a companies. Besides, agency 
theory also support that position CEO and Chairman of a firm should be hold by two 
different person.  
There are three type of agency problem which were principal-agent problem, principal-
principal problem and principal-creditor problem (Panda and Leepsa , 2017). Firstly, the 
principal-agent problem occurred due to the separation of ownership from control was 
found since the birth of large corporations (Berle & Means, 1932). The problem occurred 
when owner of the company (principal) hired the agent to manage the risk and maximizing 
the economics benefits but the agent maximizing their own private benefits instead of 
maximizing the principal economics benefits (Panda and Leepsa, 2017). Secondly, 
principal-principal problem occurred when there was conflict of interest between the major 
and minor owners. The conflict of interest happen when the major owners, who own 
majority of the share in the company had more power that allowed them to make decision 
favor to their benefits (Panda and Leepsa, 2017). Due to major owners make decision favor 
to their benefits, the interest of the minor owners would be obstructed since they have less 
power in decision making (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Lastly, the principal-creditors problem 




financing (Damodaran, 1997). When the shareholders undertaken a risky project, the cost 
of finance for the project was raised and the outstanding debt value was decreased. If the 
project success, the owners will gained the profit, but when the project is fail, the creditors 
may need to share the losses from the project (Panda and Leepsa, 2017). 
Agency theory has its restrictions and this has been highlighted by many authors like Panda 
& Leepsa (2017) , Daily et al. (2003) and Eisenhardt (1989). Panda & Leepsa (2017) 
documented the limitation in agency theory which are the theory assumes a contractual 
agreement between the principal and agent for an uncertain future period. During the 
period, many hindrances like transaction cost, rationality, fraud and information 
asymmetry could be the problem that will be faced by the principal and agent.   
Besides Agency theory, Stewardship theory is another theory that explain the association 
between principal and agents. The agent in this theory was called as the steward of the 
company. The steward is a person who is not prompted by his self-interest and aimed the 
same objectives shared with the principal (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The 
role of the agent in stewardship theory is to protect the goal of the principal. In addition, 
the agent also need ensure the wealth of the principal is maximized (Xiang, 2018).The 
objective for an agent is the same for both theory. However, stewardship theory support 
CEO Duality but not in Agency Theory. According to Davis et al. (1997), the agent can 
choose to act as a steward or agent.  The firm can choose to implement steward or agent 
theory since both theory have their own advantage but the choice depends on the 




Agency theory suggest the more independent director in a management will result in better 
company performance. This is because when more independent director in the company, 
every decision that the board make will not be biased only one party. The independent 
director will give independent judgement to protect the shareholders interest more than the 
non-independent director. This is because when non-independent director who is also the 
major shareholder in the firm may make a decision based on their own self-interest. Ameer, 
Ramli and Zakaria (2010) and  Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) finds that higher 
number of external director firm perform better performance compare to low proportion of 
external director. They found the number of independent directors positively affect the firm 
performance.  
Different from agency theory, stewardship theory believe that board with low 
independency would lead to a better performance. Besides, stewardship theory also 
suggested that CEO and Chairman should be hold by the same individual since it can 
reduce the remuneration cost (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). This is because, when two 
position holds by two different person, the cost of the remuneration will increase. 
Therefore, the firm need to pay more cost in remuneration to the managers. Different from 
stewardship theory, agency theory did not support that the two position holds by the same 
person. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Xiang found that splitting the two position will 
result better firm performance in Malaysia. This findings were also supported by Bhagat 
and Bolton (2002) and Boyd (1995) when they argued that when a person need to hold two 







2.2 Review of Empirical Studies 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance and Firm performance 
Corporate governance guideline implemented by the government bodies to shape up firm 
for a better corporate governance (Bhatt and Bhatt, 2017). Corporate governance focus on 
companies and their shareholders, or within broader definitions that include the 
accountability of companies to many other stakeholders (Farhat, 2014). The definition of 
corporate governance has not been set in solitary or unified definition but, all the definitions 
address the main elements, such as systems of control inside the company, relationships 
between the company’s stakeholders, and transparency and accountability to help the users 
of information (Farhat, 2014). According to Tricker (1984), corporate governance involved 
in setting the corporate direction, involvement in executive action, supervision and 
accountability in the firm.   
Abdullah (2014) found that Malaysian companies’ board was largely independent director 
and most of the companies was no-dual leadership. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the 
relationship between six corporate governance structures which are board size, board 
composition, role duality, multiple directorship, top 5 shareholders and managerial 
shareholdings and two corporate performance measures, namely, market (Q-Ratio) and 
accounting (ROA) returns. The author used linear regressions found that role duality and 
managerial shareholdings are significantly associated with ROA.  For the role duality, the 
author adapted binary data with 1 if the chairman is also the chief executive officer (CEO) 




shares owned by the executive directors of the company as a group to total shares 
outstanding was used. 
Kallamu (2016) studied on the impact of the revised Malaysian code on corporate 
governance on audit committee attributes and firm performance suggests that audit 
committee attributes significantly improved after the Code was revised on 2017. The audit 
committee attributes was measure by the Audit Committee Composition, Independent of 
Audit Committee Chair, Expert Directors of Audit Committee, Executive Experience of 
Audit Committee, Executive Membership of Audit Committee and Interlock of Directors 
of Audit Committee. The authors used returns on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q to measure 
the performance of the firm. The authors finding is contrary to agency theory because the 
result indicates that separating the roles of CEO and Chairman lead to poor performances.  
Firm performance or business performance is a part of organizational effectiveness that 
can be evaluate by the firm profitability (Santos and Ledur, 2012). Harward and Upton 
(1961) defines profitability as the ability to earn a return from a given investment. 
Profitability indicates how efficiently the management can make profit from all the 
business activity of the firm. It can be generalize into two categories which are margin 
ratios and return ratio. Margin Ratio is define as the ability of the company to convert sales 
into profits such as EBITDA margin, Net income/Revenues and Economic value added 
while return ratio represents the profitability of business through comparing in sales, asset 





Numerous study implemented ROA and ROE when determined the firm performance since 
the data for both variable are easy to obtain from the financial statement. Preceding studies 
depend on profitability in order to measure the firm performance (Xiang,2018; Bhatt & 
Bhatt, 2017; Arora and Sharma, 2016; Mardnly, Mouselli, and Abdulraouf,2018).  Xiang 
(2018) depends on ROA and ROE of the company to measure the firm performance. In 
addition, Shukeri, Ong and Shaari (2012) depend on the ROE to measure the firm 
profitability. Therefore, the study adapted ROA and ROE in order to determine the firm 
performance. 
2.2.2 Dependent Variable – ROA and ROE 
Numerous researcher have used on ROA as a variable to measure the firm profitability.  
Xiang (2018), Haji (2014) and Joh (2003) relied on ROA as an indicator to measure the 
firm performance. According to Haji (2014), ROA is calculate by dividing net income to 
total assets of the companies. ROA is one of profitability ratio that measure the competent 
a firm can manage its assets to produce profits.  
Previous researchers have shown a mixed finding when analyzing the corporate 
governance and ROA. Mardnly, Mouselli, and Abdulraouf (2018) found that positive and 
significant impact of ownership structure on firm performance as measure by ROA. The 
result indicates that when the manager own more share in the company, the firm 
performance of the company will increase.  
Xiang (2018) study about 100 firm listed in Malaysia found different relationship between 
the corporate governance and the firm profitability (ROA and ROE).   Xiang (2018) found 




found that board size had negative relationship with ROA. When the number of 
independent director and women director increased, the ROA value also will increase. 
However, CEO duality and Ownership concentration are insignificant in explaining the 
firm performance. Lastly, Johl et, el. (2015) studied on Board Characteristics and Firm 
Performance applied Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression in the study found that 
board independence does not affect firm ROA. The study collected data from 700 public 
listed firm in Malaysia for the year 2009 also show that size and board accounting/financial 
expertise are positively relationship with firm performance.  
Besides ROA, Return on Equity (ROE) is another indicator to measure the firm 
profitability. ROE is derived from the net income to total equity of the companies. Mixed 
findings found between the relationship of corporate governance variable and ROE. 
Shukeri, Ong and Shaari (2012) find that board composition has negative relationship with 
ROE while gender diversity is insignificant in explaining the ROE. It shows that women 
director did not give any impact to the profitability of the firm. In addition, the also found 
that when the number of independent director on board increased, the value of the ROE 
will be decreased. Thus, the lesser the independent director, the better the value of ROE. 
Next, Xiang (2018) found that CEO duality has positive effect to ROE while Board size is 
negatively related to ROE. The finding shows that when the company implemented CEO 
Duality, the value of ROE increased but when the number of independent director 
increased, the ROE value decreased. 
Given the above, this study will implemented ROA and ROE that were used in past 




2.2.3 CEO Duality and Company Performances 
CEO is the chief leader that take up the highest position in an organization (Boal & 
Hooijberg, 2001). The decision made by the CEO and the organization may significantly 
impact the stakeholders goals. (Glick, 2011). According to Freeman and Reed (1983), 
stakeholders include the shareholders, customers, employees, society and suppliers. One 
of the factor that stakeholders’ value towards the company is the manager able to satisfy 
the stakeholders (Xiang, 2018). Meanwhile, Chairman is a person that chair the board 
meetings who might be an executive director or a non-executive director (Farhat, 2014). 
Chairman need to establish policies and making decision in the company.  
CEO duality happens when CEO and Chairman of an organization are hold by the same 
person. From the negative perspective, CEO duality can cause unpleasant performance to 
the company since the board of the director unable to dismiss the CEO position when the 
CEO practices at his own interest using the shareholders wealth (White and Ingrassia, 
1992). Jensen (1993) stated that the position of CEO and Chairman should be hold by two 
persons in order for the board to be effective. In view of the fact, CEO cannot perform the 
role of Chairman to oversee the process of monitored the CEO and run board meetings 
(Jensen, 1993).  
Agency theory support that the roles CEO and Chairman of a firm should be hold by two 
different person. In contrast, steward theory suggested that both position should be held by 
the same person (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). MCCG 2012 and 2017 support the agency 




Previous study found mixed relationship found between CEO Duality and company 
performances. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that splitting the two position will result 
better firm performance in Malaysia. This findings were also supported by Bhagat and 
Bolton (2002) and Boyd (1995). Meanwhile Xiang (2018) found that CEO duality is 
significantly positive related to ROE but not in explaining ROA. The findings explained 
that when the company practice CEO Duality, the ROE value of the company increased. 
However, Farhat (2014) and Faccio and Weir et al. (2002) found that CEO duality has no 
relationship with the company performance. Their findings indicates that whether the 
company practice CEO Duality or not, it will not affected the firm profitability. 
2.2.4 Gender Diversity and Company Performance 
Diversity in the composition of organizational groups is important because it can affect 
satisfaction, creativity, and turnover in the organization (Milliken and Martins, 1996) 
because female and male directors are different in their character and risk attitudes (Adam 
and Funk, 2009). For example, female directors have better attendance records than male 
directors in attending board meeting and female are more likely to join monitoring 
committees (Adam and Ferreira, 2009). In addition, men were found more likely to lie than 
female in order to secure monetory benefit (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008). Burgess and 
Tharenou (2002) points out that female director need to be recruited in board in order to 
increased diversity of opinions in the boardroom and insufficient competent male directors. 
According to Matsa and Miller (2013), female directors care less about achievement and 
power. They are more about self-transcendent values that lead female director are more 
stakeholder-oriented. Low representative of female in board need to be investigated since 




MCCG 2017 stated the involvement of women as a director must be at least thirty percent 
in the company (MCCG, 2017). This signifies the importance of gender diversity in the 
board of director. Datuk Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak stated that 15 of the top 100 PLCs 
such as Petronas Gas Bhd, Sime Darby Property Bhd, AMMB Holdings Bhd, Top Glove 
Corp Bhd and Gamuda Bhd, had exceeded the 30 percent quota. (New Straits Times, 23 
January 2018).On 2020, Malaysia targeted to ensure at least 30 percent of the listed 
companies’ board to be made up of women in decision-making roles (New Straits Times,23 
January 2018). 
The importance of women in board of director has widely discussed by past researchers 
(Adam and Ferreira, 2004; Hillman, 2015; Post and Byron, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009). 
According to past researcher, the performance of firm had positive relationship with the 
female involvement on board (Adam and Ferreira,2004; Adam and Funk,2009; Canyon 
and He,2016 ). Adam and Ferreira (2004) found women appear to have a significant effect 
on board governance. Female director allocate more effort in monitoring compare to male 
director (Adam and Ferreira, 2009). Female directors were found to be more audacity than 
male directors (Adam and Funk,2009).The finding was also supported by Canyon and He 
(2016) that the existence women in the board show a positive effect on firm performance. 
The existence of female directors in the board had more impact to the high performance 
firm (Canyon and He, 2016).  
However, a few studies found that a higher percentage of women in board of director show 
a negative association with firm performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 
2013;Xiang; 2018). Besides, Matsa and Miller (2013) studies also show that when the 




Xiang (2018) found that gender diversity is not significant in explaining the firm 
performance (ROE). 
2.2.5 Independent Director and Company Performance 
Independent director is not an executive director of the corporation and do not have any 
business that could intervene the independent judgement (Bursa Malaysia). In addition, 
according to Bursa Malaysia, rule 1.01, independent director is not the major shareholder 
and not a family in the corporation. MCCG 2012 stated that more than half of the board 
must consist of independent directors while the chairman of the board was a dependent 
director. In MCCG 2017, stated that more fifty percent of the board must consist of 
independent directors but does not stated whether the chairman should be independent 
director or not. Moreover, a nominating committees chaired by an Independent Director 
must be establish to evaluate the independency of the board.  
According to Klein (2002), one of the effective mechanism to monitor the accounting 
process is board independent. Firm with high proportion of external director are more 
effective because they manage to stand pressures from the firm’s management and do not 
have self interest in the firm (Johari et, al., 2008). Vrenken (2013) stated that one of the 
task of the board is to control the management which is very difficult. Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Biekpe (2006) argue that independent director able to fire manager that do not perform 
well to protect the shareholders interest.Therefore, board of director must consist of 
independent director.  
Beasley (1996) provides evidence that no-fraud firms do have high independency board 




(2010) who concluded that higher proportion of external director firm perform better 
performance compare to low proportion of external director. A company with more 
external director perform better than company with more internal director (Ameer, Ramli 
and Zakaria, 2010). Besides, Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) studied on board 
independence and firm performance in China also found that both variables are positive in 
relationship. However, Millstein & MacAvoy (1998) finding show higher number of 
independent director and firm performance have negative relationship.  
In contrast, Bhagat and Black (2001) finding show that there is no significant relation board 
independency and firm performance. The firms suffer low profitability when the proportion 
of independent director increase (Bhagat and Black, 2001). The study by Vrenken (2013) 
also show a negative relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
Zabri et al. (2016) and Mustapa et al. (2015) found that independent directors has no 
relationship with the firm profitability which are ROA and ROE.   
2.2.6 Audit Committee Independency and Company Performance 
Audit committee with qualified member are needed to ensure reliable financial reporting, 
internal controls, and risk management to protect the stakeholder’s interest. (DeZoort, 
Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed,2002). This highlight the importance of an effective 
audit committee in protecting the stakeholder interest and maximize their wealth. Mohd 
Saleh et, al. (2007) pointed the effective characteristic of audit committee are the 
independence of members, size, frequency of meeting and knowledge of the members of 
audit committee to monitor management behavior. Toh (2013) also stated that the role of 




Besides audit committee also need to review management’s financial reporting judgment 
and report the analysis to the board of directors. Therefore, an effective audit committee 
should often meet so that they can discuss on the issue regarding the audit (Toh, 2013). 
MCCG 2017 provides enhancement in audit independency by stating that all audit 
committee member should be independent director and the chairman of audit committee 
should not be the chairman of the company.  
Mohd Saleh et, al. (2007) study on Audit committee characteristics and earnings 
management in Malaysia found that fully independent audit committee reduces earnings 
management practices. In addition, the finding also has been supported by Toh (2013) 
study on the measuring the relationship between audit committee characteristics and 
earnings management that found negative relationship between audit committee 
independency and management earning. The findings proved that when more independent 
director as the committee of audit management, the less the firm’s earning. Similar to 
Malaysia, Baxter and Cotter (2009) study in Australia found that greater proportion of audit 
committee independency is associated with lower earning management. Lastly, Davidson 
et al. (2005) found insignificant relationship between audit committees comprising a 
majority of non-executives. The result support that the independency of audit committee 








2.2.7 Risk Management Committee and Company Performance 
Risk management is important in a business to minimize risk may occur in the business. 
Risk management is not only about minimize the risk, but it also protect the business from 
failure. Nowadays, companies were diversify their business activity which leads to 
increasing in risk to the business. Therefore, risk management is significant to the business 
because it was a way to confronting the risk. According to Aven (2016), risk management 
was methods on how to manage, access and conceptualize risk that used theoretical 
platform and practical models and procedures. There were three aspects that risk 
management can increase the value of financial flexibility, capital allocation and 
performance management, and operational flexibility (Azizah and Islam, 2014). Firstly, 
risk management can increase the financial flexibility at minimum cost because it can 
protect the difficult in finance. Besides, it can improve the capital allocation by controlling 
the activity management.  
Azizah and Islam (2014) found that risk management and performance has a negative 
relationship. Nair, Purohit and Choudhary (2014) study used seven dimension of risk 
management to test the significant. They found that credit risk assessment, risk 
management practices, risk identification, and risk assessment analysis had significant 
influence on the business performance. Mixed finding found by Roberts (2016) that studied 
on measuring and managing risk in UK listed firms found positive correlation between 
risks management and corporate governance. This finding is supported by Kwamboka 
(2010) that studied on the relationship between corporate governance and risk management 
practices. He found that a good practice of risk management firm give positive effect of 







Chapter 3 will review the methodology used in the study. It cover the data sources, 
sampling criteria, determinants and the empirical models applied in this research.  
3.2 Design of the research 
Generally, the design of the research is the plan structure during the time carrying the study. 
The aim of research design is to allow the researcher provide evidence to answer all the 
research questions (Vaus,2001). Research design is very important because it contain the 
strategy and conceptual framework of the research. Moreover, research design also explain 
the procedures in collecting data during the study and tools that will be used to interpret 
the data.   
In this study, quantitative approach is used to test the impact of Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2017) on the performance (ROA and ROE) of Malaysian 
public listed companies. The corporate governance variable used in this research are 
variables are CEO duality, CEO Gender, Independent Director, Tenure of Independent 
Director, Female Director, Risk Management Committee and Audit Committee 
Independency. The qualitative data was collected from the annual report of the companies. 
The annual report of the companies are downloaded. The data collected from the annual 




Lastly, the study adapted Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis is used to test the 
relationship and significant of the study. The study adapted multiple regression research 
since the independent variables in the study have more than one. According to Field (2009), 
a regression analysis can predict the future evaluation based on values of the predictor 
variables. The multiple regression result can explain the relationship between the variables. 
Therefore, the multiple regression was used in the study. 
3.3 Hypothesis of the Study 
First hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: CEO Duality is negatively related to ROA. 
Hypothesis: CEO Duality is negatively related to ROE. 
Second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis:  CEO Gender is negatively related to ROA. 
Hypothesis: CEO Gender is negatively related to ROE 
Third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Independent Director is positively related to ROA. 
Hypothesis: Independent Director is positively related to ROE 
Fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Tenure of Independent Director is negatively related to ROA. 





Hypothesis: Female Director is positively related to ROA. 
Hypothesis: Female Director is positively related to ROE 
Sixth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Audit Committee independency is negatively related to ROA. 
Hypothesis: Audit Committee independency is negatively related to ROE. 
Seventh hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Risk Management Committee is negatively related to ROA. 













3.4 Method of data collection 
Data collection is defined as a process of collecting the data from all relevant sources. The 
data sources can be collected by two sources that are primary sources and secondary 
sources. Primary sources is the first-hand evidence such as interview, historical document 
or recording of audio. In this study, the secondary data is used. The secondary data are 
already existed but has not been primarily collected (Xiang, 2018).This study collected 
data from secondary sources. The data were collected from the annual report published in 
Bursa Malaysia and company website. 
The secondary data were collected from the annual financial report for year 2016 until 2018 
in order to measure the impact of MCCG 2017 on the performance (ROA and ROE) of 
Malaysian public listed companies. The ROA and ROE variables are extracted from the 
financial statement and income statement  while the corporate governance variable are 
extracted from the board of director information of the companies that downloaded from 











3.5 Sampling Criteria 
Williamson (2002) define a population as a complete set of all those elements which have 
one or more common characteristics. The population of this study were selected from the 
companies that are listed in 2019.  There are 920 companies that are listed in the Bursa 
Malaysia. The listed company can be divided into two categories that are Main or ACE 
Markets. There are 19 sector companies that are listed in Bursa Malaysia. In this study, 13 
sector out of 19 sector were selected that comprises of 90 firms in Malaysia. The study 
only cover 90 companies which are randomly selected that are listed under the Main 
Markets. Roscoe (1975) suggested the rule of thumb stated that sample size should be 
larger than 30 and smaller than 500 and at least 10 percent from the population size. Thus, 
with a population of 792 public listed companies in Main Market, a sample size of 90 
public listed companies or 11.36% of the population is adequate for this study. The 








Companies Sector selected as sample 
Figure 1 shows the sector that were selected for the 90 company. The company were 
randomly selected based on the accessibility of annual reports. The companies selected 
from the population have more than 10 companies in Industrial Product and Services and 
Consumer Products and Services.  Out of 90 company selected, 54 company are 
categorized as Large Company.  
Out of 920 companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, 792 companies are listed under Main 
Market while 128 companies under the ACE Market. The study only cover 90 companies 
which are randomly selected that are listed under the Main Markets. Roscoe (1975) 
suggested the rule of thumb stated that sample size should be larger than 30 and smaller 
than 500 and at least 10 percent from the population size. Thus, with a population of 792 
public listed companies in Main Market, a sample size of 90 public listed companies or 
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3.6 Research Instrument 
The data is obtained from the annual financial reports of Public Listed Company from the 
Bursa Malaysia website. The ROA and ROE is calculated by using the Microsoft Excel.   
All data were collected from balance sheet, income statement and corporate governance 
statement of firm for the year 2016 and 2018. Next, the data were inserted into SPSS to 
perform the descriptive analysis, reliability test and Multiple Linear Regression. 
3.7 Construct Instrument 
According to previous chapter, four corporate governance characteristic are employ as 
determinants of the firm performance. Table below shows the dependent and independent 
variable with their measure. 
Table 3.2 
Dependent Variables  
Dependent Variable Formula  
Return of Total Assets 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 












Independent Variables Table 
Independent Variable Formula 
CEO Duality  
 
1= CEO Duality 
0= No CEO Duality 
Independent Director Proportion of Independent Director 
Female Director on board  Proportion of Women Directors 
Audit Committee Independency Proportion of Independent Director in 
Audit Committee 
Tenure of Independent Director Average tenure services of Independent 
Director 
Risk Management Committee 1= Board establish a Risk Management 
Committee 





















Return of Total Assets ROA 
Return of Equity  ROE 
CEO Duality  
 
CEO_DUA 
CEO Gender CEO_GEN 
Independent Director IND_DIR 
Female Director on board  FEM_DIR 
Audit Committee Independency AUD_IND 
Tenure of Independent Director TEN_DIR 







3.8 Data Analysis 
3.8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis was adopted in this study to obtain the summary of the data that we 
computed in the SPSS. The analysis consist mean, mode and standard deviation for the 
variables that we computed data. Through the summary analysis, researcher gain 
information on the pattern of the sample in the study. 
3.8.2 Reliability Analysis 
The reliability test is adopted in the study to test the significant of the model that we 
computed in SPSS. The ANOVA result whether the tested model is significant or 
insignificant. The result is significant if the p-value is less than 0.05. However, if the p-
value is more than 0.05, therefore the independent variable is not significant in explaining 












3.8.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple Regression is the process of calculating a coefficient and predict the value of 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Besides, Multiple Regression assess the strength of a relationship 
between one independent variables. Therefore, in order to determine the relationship of 
corporate governance and firm performance, multiple regression analysis is adapted in this 
study. 
The empirical model used in this study is given as: 
Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5+ b6X6+ b7X7 + ε 
The model adopted for the analysis is as follows using the names of the variables: 
Model 1: 
ROA = b0 + b1CEO_DUA + b2 CEO_GEN + b3 IND_DIR + b4 FEM_DIR + b5 
TEN_DIR + b6AUD_IND + b7 RISK_COM + ε 
Model 2: 
ROE = b0 + b1CEO_DUA + b2 CEO_GEN + b3 IND_DIR + b4 FEM_DIR + b5 
TEN_DIR + b6AUD_IND + b7 RISK_COM + ε 
Where; 
ROA is the return on assets 
ROE is the return on equity 
CEO_DUA is the CEO Duality  
CEO_GEN is the CEO Gender 




FEM_DIR is the Female Director on board   
AUD_IND is the Audit Committee Independency  
TEN_DIR is the Tenure of Independent Director 





























RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter present the outcomes of this studies and present the outcomes to answer the 
question of the study. 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.1 
ROA and ROE descriptive analysis 
 Year N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 2018 90 -0.27 1.17 0.0641 0.1546 
 2017 90 -.017 0.98 0.0706 0.1286 
 2016 90 -0.21 0.99 0.0785 0.1412 
ROE 2018 90 -0.69 2.29 0.1744 0.39425 
 2017 90 -0.24 2.85 0.1729 0.3628 
 2016 90 -0.36 3.14 0.2209 0.4425 
 
Table 4.1 reported descriptive analysis of ROA and ROE for the year 2016 until 2018. The 
number of data were collected for each year was 90 data. The table indicates that the 
minimum and maximum value of ROA for the three years were -0.27 and 1.17 respectively. 
While the ROE values shows the minimum and maximum values for the three years were 
-0.69 and 3.14 respectively. The findings show that in year 2016 (0.0785), the ROA mean 




decreased to six percent in the 2018. This demonstrate that 2016 was the great in generating 
its earnings among the three years. Out of the documentation period, the highest value for 
ROE was the year 2016 (0.2209).The minimum and maximum values of ROE for the three 
years are -0.69 and 3.14 respectively. The mean values of ROE decreased to 17.44 percent 
on the year 2017 and slightly increased to 17.44 percent on 2018. Both ROA and ROE 
values on the year 2018 dropped compared to the year 2016. 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive analysis before MCCG 2017. 
 Dummy Frequency N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CEO_DUA 0 173 180 0 1   
1 7   
CEO_GEN 0 169 180 0 1   
1 11   
IND_DIR   180 0.23 0.80 0.48 0.126 
FEM_DIR   180 0.00 0.43 0.15 0.117 
TEN_DIR   180 0.50 18.33 6.06 4.047 
AUD_IND   180 0.25 1.00 0.86 0.161 
RISK_COM 0 82 180 0 1   
1 98   
 
Table 4.2 indicates the descriptive analysis before MCCG 2017 was introduced as Code of 
Corporate Governance. The data provided the average indicators of the variables computed 




independent variables used in the research. From the table we know that 173 of the 
observation split the roles of Chief Executive Officer/ Managing Director and Chairman. 
The remaining seven (7) observation practices CEO Duality. In addition, 169 observation 
are male CEO while only 11 observation were female CEO.  The mean for the independent 
director is 48 percent which indicates that 48 percent of the board of director was 
independent director. In addition, the table also shows that the mean of Female Director 
and Independent Director of Audit Committee were 15 percent  and 86 percent 
respectively. This indicates that the proportion of female directors still low since the 
proportion for female director below 30 percent from the board of directors. For the 
independent director, the proportion in board of director is high since more than 50 percent 
from the board are independent director. The descriptive statistic for Risk Management 
Committee indicates that 98 out of 180 observation establish Risk Management Committee 


















Descriptive analysis after MCCG 2017. 
 Dummy Frequency N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CEO_DUA 0 89 90 0.00 1.00   
 1 1   
CEO_GEN 0 84 90 0.00 1.00   
 1 6   
IND_DIR   90 0.14 0.80 0.491 0.126 
FEM_DIR   90 0.00 0.50 0.212 0.123 
TEN_DIR   90 0.78 17.75 5.347 3.401 
AUD_IND   90 0.50 1.00 0.859 0.161 
RISK_COM 0 23 90 0 1   
 1 67   
 
Table 4.3 indicates the descriptive analysis before MCCG 2017 was introduced as Code of 
Corporate Governance. The data provided the average indicators of the variables computed 
from the Annual report on year 2018 with 90 company. There are seven (7) independent 
variables used in the research. From the table, we can observed that out of 90 company, 
only 1 company practices CEO Duality. The balance 89 company divide the role of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the company. Besides, the table also recorded 
that 86 CEO of the company was Male. In addition, the mean proportion of Independent 
Director and Female Director from the Board of Director were 80 percent and 50 percent 




With this result, this means that majority of the company has achieved the minimum of 30 
percent of Female Director in Board of Director. Next, the average tenure of Independent 
Director for 90 company was 17.75 years old. The mean for Independent Director in Audit 
Committee is 0.859. Out of 90 company collected on 2018, 67 company established a risk 
management committee and the remaining 23 company do not have a risk management 
committee. 
Table 4.4 
Comparison of Dummy Variables  
Years   
CEO_DUA 
0= Other 





0= No Risk Management 
Committee 
1= Board establish a Risk 
Management Committee 
2016 0 86 85 49 
2017 0 87 84 33 
2018 0 89 84 23 
2016 1 4 5 41 
2017 1 3 6 57 
2018 1 1 6 67 
 
Table 4.4 discussed the comparison of three dummy variables (CEO Duality, Gender of 
the CEO and Risk Management Committee) for three years (2016, 2017 and 2018). The 
numbers of company practices CEO duality lower than the company that split the roles of 
CEO and Chairman. The highest number of company that practice split roles of CEO and 
Chairman was on the year 2018 (89 company) which was parallel with MCCG 2017 that 
stated that the company CEO and Chairman should be hold by two different person. 




majority of the company established a risk management committee. The highest number 
of company that established the risk management committee was on the year 2018 with 67 























4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.5 
Correlation Matrix of Variables before the Revision of MCCG 2017. 

















1                 
CEO_GE
N 
-0.045 1               
IND_DIR 0.211 -0.053 1             
FEM_DIR -0.036 0.145 -0.075 1           
TEN_DIR 0.126 0.143 -0.028 -0.108 1         
AUD_IND 0.085 0.010 0.249 -0.117 0.130 1       
RISK_CO
M 
-0.129 -0.043 -0.036 0.131 -0.224 0.092 1     
ROA 0.049 0.323 -0.124 0.179 -0.005 -0.041 0.004 1   
ROE -0.019 0.125 -0.104 0.300 -0.029 -0.131 -0.004 0.623 1 
 
The correlation matrix reported the correlation between the variables. There are nine (9) 
variables conducted in the study. Correlation analysis was applied to find the relationship 
between the variables and how each variables affect others variables during a period of 
time. Based on the report, there are mixed relationship between the variables either positive 
or negative relationship. Overall, no multicollinearity detected between the variables since 
the correlation value between the two variables were not high. The highest correlation 
value was 0.249 between the Audit Committee Independency and Independent Director in 
Board of Director. The value of 24.9 percent was not considered high. Therefore, no 




There are negative relationship between Gender of CEO (CEO_GEN) and CEO Duality 
(CEO_DUAL), Independent Director (IND_DIR) and Gender of CEO (CEO_GEN), 
Female Director (FEM_DIR) and CEO Duality (CEO_DUAL), Female Director (FEM_DIR) 
and Independent Director (IND_DIR), Tenure of the Independent Director (TEN_DIR) and 
Independent Director (IND_DIR), Tenure of the Independent Director (TEN_DIR) and 
Female Director (FEM_DIR), Audit Committee Independency (AUD_IND) and Female 
Director (FEM_DIR), Risk Management Committee (RISK_COM) and CEO Duality 
(CEO_DUAL), Risk Management Committee (RISK_COM) and Gender of CEO (CEO_GEN) 
and Risk Management Committee (RISK_COM) and Independent Director (IND_DIR). Others 














Table 4.6   
Correlation Matrix of Variables after the Revision of MCCG 2017. 


















1                 
CEO_GEN -0.028 1               
IND_DIR 0.243 -0.136 1             
FEM_DIR 0.102 0.062 -0.071 1           
TEN_DIR -0.060 0.137 -0.084 -0.124 1         
AUD_IND 0.093 -0.112 0.307 -0.211 0.131 1       
RISK_CO
M 
0.062 -0.048 -0.151 0.140 -0.123 -0.020 1     
ROA -0.029 0.321 -0.104 0.170
0 
-0.091 -0.024 0.040 1   
ROE -0.037 0.115 -0.153 0.302 -0.073 -0.151 0.002 0.706 1 
 
Table 4.6 show the correlation matrix of Variables after the revision of MCCG 2017. There 
are nine (9) variables conducted in the study. Correlation analysis was applied to find the 
relationship between the variables and how each variables affect others variables during a 
period of time. Based on the report, there are mixed relationship between the variables 
either positive or negative relationship. . The highest value of the correlation between the 
variables was not considered high. Overall, no multicollinearity detected between the 
variables since the correlation value between the two variables were not high. Therefore, 




There are positive relationship between Independent Director (IND_DIR) and CEO Duality 
(CEO_DUAL), Female Director (FEM_DIR) and CEO Duality (CEO_DUAL), Female 
Director (FEM_DIR) and Gender of CEO (CEO_GEN), Tenure of the Independent Director 
(TEN_DIR) and Gender of CEO (CEO_GEN), Audit Committee Independency (AUD_IND) 
and CEO Duality (CEO_DUAL), Audit Committee Independency (AUD_IND) and 
Independent Director (IND_DIR), Audit Committee Independency (AUD_IND) and Tenure of 
the Independent Director (TEN_DIR), Risk Management Committee (RISK_COM) and CEO 
Duality (CEO_DUAL) and Risk Management Committee (RISK_COM) and Female Director 















4.3 Reliability Test 
Table 4.7 
ANOVA Results before and after the revision for ROA 
  Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Before Regression 0.530 7 .076 4.741 0.000b 
Residual 2.712 170 .016   
Total 3.242 177    
After Regression 0.322 7 .046 2.091 0.054b 
Residual 1.804 82 .022   
Total 2.126 89    
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Predictors: (Constant), RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, 
AUD_IND, CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR 
 
Table 4.7 show the ANOVA Results before and after the revision for ROA. The model for 
ROA before the revision of MCCG with seven predictors produced F (7,170) = 4.741, p 
=0.000. The p-value indicates the level of marginal significance. The p-value is considered 
significance when the p-value is p < 0.05. The results show that the independent variables 
are significant in explaining the ROA since the p-value is less than 0.05.  
The model for ROA after the revision of MCCG with seven predictors produced F (7, 82) 
= 2.091, p = 0.054. The results indicates that the independent variables are insignificant in 









ANOVA Results before and after the revision for ROE 
  Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Before Regression 3.859 7 0.551 3.700 0.001b 
Residual 25.332 170 0.149   
Total 29.191 177    
After Regression 1.732 7 0.247 1.676 0.126b 
Residual 12.101 82 0.148   
Total 13.833 89    
 Dependent Variable: ROE 
Predictors: (Constant), RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, 
AUD_IND, CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR 
 
Table 4.7 show the ANOVA Results before and after the revision for ROE. The model for 
ROE before the revision of MCCG with seven predictors produced F (7,170) = 3.7000, p 
=0.001. The p-value indicates the level of marginal significance. The p-value is considered 
significance when the p-value is p < 0.05. The results show that the independent variables 
are significant in explaining the ROE since the p-value is less than 0.05.  
The model for ROE after the revision of MCCG with seven predictors produced F (7, 82) 
= 1.676, p = 0.126. The results indicates that the independent variables are insignificant in 









4.4 Multiple Regression Model 
Table 4.9 
Model Summary before and after the revision for ROA 
 R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Before 0.404a 0.163 0.129 0.1263 
After 0.389a 0.151 0.079 0.1483 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 
CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR 
 
The value of R2 explained the proportion of the dependent variables (ROA), that can be 
explained by independent variables (RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, 
AUD_IND, CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR). From the result above, it can be found that the R2 
before the revision is 16.3 percent. The value indicates that 16.3 percent of variation in 
ROA is explained by RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 
CEO_DUA and TEN_DIR. The remaining 83.7 percent of variation in ROA is explained 
by other factor that are not mention in the study. The adjusted R2 value and the Standard 
Error of the Estimate before the revision for this model is 0.129 (12.9percent) and 
0.1263(12.63percent) respectively. 
 
The R2 after the revision is 15.1 percent. The value indicates that 15.1 percent of variation 
in ROA is explained by RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 
CEO_DUA and TEN_DIR. The remaining 84.9 percent of variation in ROA is explained 




Error of the Estimate after the revision for this model is 0.079 (7.9percent). and 
0.1483(14.83percent) respectively. 
Table 4.10 
Model Summary before and after the revision for ROE 
 R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Before 0.364a 0.132 0.096 0.3860 
After 0.354a 0.125 0.051 0.3842 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 
CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR 
 
The value of R2 explained the proportion of the dependent variables (ROE) that can be 
explained by independent variables (RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, 
AUD_IND, CEO_DUA, TEN_DIR). From the result above, it can be found that the R2 
before the revision is 13.2 percent. The value indicates that 13.2 percent of variation in 
ROE is explained by RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 
CEO_DUA and TEN_DIR. The remaining 86.8 percent of variation in ROE is explained 
by other factor that are not mention in the study. The adjusted R2 value and the Standard 
Error of the Estimate before the revision for this model is 0.096 (9.6percent) and 0.3860 
(38.60percent) respectively. 
 
The R2 after the revision is 12.5 percent. The value indicates that 12.5 percent of variation 
in ROE is explained by RISK_COM, IND_DIR, CEO_GEN, FEM_DIR, AUD_IND, 




by other factor that are not mention in the study. The adjusted R2 value and the Standard 
































t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Before (Constant) 0.162 0.063  2.559 0.011 
CEO_DUA 0.095 0.051 0.137 1.861 0.064 
CEO_GEN 0.175 0.041 0.312 4.271 0.000 
IND_DIR -0.148 0.079 -0.138 -1.876 0.062 
FEM_DIR 0.156 0.084 0.135 1.863 0.064 
TEN_DIR -0.001 0.003 -0.023 -0.308 .759 
AUD_IND -0.060 0.061 -0.071 -0.975 0.331 
RISK_COM 0.005 0.020 0.019 0.253 0.800 
After (Constant) 0.014 0.115  0.126 0.900 
CEO_DUA -0.049 0.156 -0.033 -0.313 0.755 
CEO_GEN 0.204 0.064 0.331 3.172 0.002 
IND_DIR -0.095 0.139 -0.077 -0.684 0.496 
FEM_DIR 0.188 0.134 0.149 1.403 0.165 
TEN_DIR -0.006 0.005 -0.137 -1.288 0.201 
AUD_IND 0.086 0.106 0.090 0.811 0.420 





Based on Table 4.11, the Unstandardized Coefficients are used in order to analyze the result 
of the regression. The multiple regression equation before the revision of MCCG 2017 is 
written as the below equation; 
ROA= 0.162 + 0.095 CEO_DUA + 0.175 CEO_GEN-0.095IND_DIR + 0.188 FEM_DIR 
0.006 TEN_DIR -0.060 AUD_IND + 0.005 RISK_COM   
Based on the equation above, the intercept value 0.162 indicates that when CEO Duality, 
Gender of CEO, Independent Director, Female Director, Tenure of Independent Director, 
Audit Committee Independency and Risk Management Committee are equal to zero, the 
ROA becomes 0.162. When one unit in independent variable is increased, the ROA will 
increased by the coefficient of independent variable. For example, ROA is expected to 
increase by 0.095 units when one unit is increased in CEO Duality. From the table, it is 
proven that only Gender of CEO is found to be statistically significant as p-value less than 
0.05. Other variables (CEO Duality, Independent Director, Female Director, Tenure of 
Independent Director, Audit Independency and Risk Management Committee are 
insignificant since the p-value are more than 0.05. Further, the model shows that CEO 
Duality, Gender of CEO, Female Director and Risk Management Committee are positively 
relationship with ROA. In contrast, Independent Director, Tenure of Independent Director 
and Audit Independency are negative relationship with ROA. 
The multiple regression equation after the revision of MCCG 2017 is written as the below 
equation; 
ROA= 0.115 + 0.156 CEO_DUA + 0.064 CEO_GEN + 0.139IND_DIR + 0.134 




From table 4.7, we know that model above is insignificant in explaining the ROA since the 
p-value is more than 0.05. Therefore, the model for ROA after the revision is insignificant 



























t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Before (Constant) 0.391 0.194  2.016 0.045 
CEO_DUA 0.041 0.157 0.020 0.261 0.794 
CEO_GEN 0.136 0.125 0.081 1.092 0.277 
IND_DIR -0.100 0.241 -0.031 -0.416 0.678 
FEM_DIR 1.029 0.256 0.297 4.018 0.000 
TEN_DIR -0.001 0.008 -0.006 -0.080 0.937 
AUD_IND -0.349 0.188 -0.138 -1.861 0.064 
RISK_COM -0.007 0.061 -0.009 -0.117 0.907 
After (Constant) 0.308 0.297  1.037 0.303 
CEO_DUA -0.123 0.404 -0.033 -0.306 0.760 
CEO_GEN 0.131 0.166 .083 0.787 0.433 
IND_DIR -0.364 0.360 -0.116 -1.012 0.315 
FEM_DIR 0.918 0.347 0.286 2.647 0.010 
TEN_DIR -0.007 0.012 -0.062 -0.576 0.566 
AUD_IND -0.091 0.275 -0.037 -0.331 0.742 





Based on Table 4.12, the Unstandardized Coefficients are used in order to analyze the result 
of the regression. The multiple regression equation before the revision of MCCG 2017 is 
written as the below equation; 
ROE= 0.391 + 0.041 CEO_DUA + 0.136 CEO_GEN -0.100 IND_DIR + 1.029 FEM_DIR 
- 0.001 TEN_DIR -0.349 AUD_IND -0.007 RISK_COM   
Based on the equation above, the intercept value 0.391 indicates that when CEO Duality, 
Gender of CEO, Independent Director, Female Director, Tenure of Independent Director, 
Audit Committee Independency and Risk Management Committee are equal to zero, the 
ROE becomes 0.391.When one unit in independent variable is increased, the ROA will 
increased by the coefficient of independent variable. For example, ROE is expected to 
increase by 0.041 units when one unit is increased in CEO Duality. From the table, it is 
proven that only Female Director is found to be statistically significant as p-value less than 
0.05. Other variables (CEO Duality, Independent Director, Gender of CEO, Tenure of 
Independent Director, Audit Independency and Risk Management Committee are 
insignificant since the p-value are more than 0.05. Moreover, the model shows that CEO 
Duality, Gender of CEO and Female Director are positively relationship with ROE. In 
contrast, Independent Director, Tenure of Independent Director, Risk Management 
Committee Independent Director and Audit Independency are negative relationship with 
ROE. 





ROE= 0.297 + 0.404 CEO_DUA + 0.064 CEO_GEN + 0.360 IND_DIR + 0.347 
FEM_DIR + 0.005 TEN_DIR +0.106 AUD_IND + 0.037 RISK_COM 
From table 4.7, we know that model above is insignificant in explaining the ROE since the 
p-value is more than 0.05. Therefore, the model for ROE after the revision is insignificant 





















4.5 Summary for the variable relationship 
Table 4.13 
ROA result 
Variable  Significant/Insignificant Relationship 
(positive/ negative) 
CEO Duality  
 
There is no significant relationship between 
CEO Duality and ROA. 
 
Positive 
CEO Gender There is significant relationship between 




There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 
Risk Management Committee and ROA. 
Positive 
 
The empirical finding for Model ROA shows that ROA is positively affected by CEO 




they are negatively impacted by Independent Director, Audit Committee Independency and 
Tenure of Independent Director. Below are the summary for ROA analysis. 
Table 4.14 
ROE result 
Variable  Significant/Insignificant Relationship 
CEO Duality  
 
There is no significant relationship between 
CEO Duality and the profitability of bank. 
Positive 
CEO Gender There is no significant relationship between 




There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 





There is a significant relationship between 





There is no significant relationship between 
Risk Management Committee and ROE. 
Negative 
 
The empirical finding for Model ROE shows that firm performance are positively affected 
by CEO Gender, CEO Duality and Female Director on board. But, they are negatively 






























CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss about conclusion to the finding in the study with the 
recommendation for the future study. Besides, this chapter will discuss on the limitation of 
the study. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The growing interest in corporate governance and firm performance has attract more study 
has been made in the area. Most of the variables used in the research are found insignificant 
to the firm performance. Based on the study, only Tenure of Independent Director and CEO 
Gender are significant in explaining the dependent variables. This indicates that there are 
some other factor that impact the firm performance which is not in the study. Therefore, 
future research need to include others factor that may affect the firm performance. 
Recently, Malaysia faced a financial scandal which is 1Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB) scandal that affect the capital markets’ perception of Malaysia. Thus, the 
regulators should revise MCCG in order to avoid the financial scandal to happen again.  
With a population of 792 public listed companies in Main Market, a sample size of 90 
public listed companies or 11.36% of the population is adequate for this study. This paper 
investigates the impact of corporate governance attributes on firm performance based on 




From the ANOVA table, we know that p-value before the MCCG was revived less than 
0.05 and p-value after the MCCG was revised is more than 0.05. The result indicates that 
shown the corporate governance after the MCCG was revised is insignificant while the 
result before the revision is significant. The results show that after MCCG was revised, the 
corporate governance improvised in the MCCG did not show an improvement to the firm 
performance. Therefore, regulators should review the corporate governance code to make 
it in suitable with the market needs. 
The purpose of the study identify the relationship of corporate governance and the 
performance of the listed companies in Malaysia. There are 90 listed companies being 
selected in Malaysia that are used to collect the data from year 2016 to 2018. In this 
research, we found the corporate governance after the MCCG was revised is insignificant 
while the result before the revision is significant. The firm performance is dependent on 
several factors that are CEO Duality, CEO Gender, Independent Director, Female Director 
on board, Audit Committee Independency, Tenure of Independent Director and Risk 
Management Committee. 
The empirical finding for Model ROA shows that ROA is positively affected by CEO 
Gender, CEO Duality, Female Director on board and Risk Management Committee. But, 
they are negatively impacted by Independent Director, Audit Committee Independency and 
Tenure of Independent Director. Below are the summary for ROA analysis. 
The empirical finding for Model ROE shows that firm performance are positively affected 
by CEO Gender, CEO Duality and Female Director on board. But, they are negatively 




Independent Director and Risk Management Committee. Below are the summary for ROE 
analysis. 
5.3 Recommendation for Future Study 
The study is limited to only listed companies and examined only some attributes of the 
corporate governance. Therefore, future researchers can look into the details contribution 
of other committee such as Nomination Committee. The corporate governance structures 
may not be the accurate variables that can explained the company performance because the 
R square from the result are low. Thus, future research also can look into other factors such 
as bank size, inflation rate and GDP.  
Moreover, future researchers could examine other companies in other sectors. Since this 
study only limited in 13 sector, future researcher can include the remaining 6 sector that 
are not included in this study. Moreover, since the study only collected 2018 data for after 
the MCCG 2017, therefore, future researchers could include data for the year after 2018 
since the data model for the data after MCCG was revised is not significant.  
In addition, future studies could look at the market based performance instead of firm 
performance. For instance, Tobin’s Q ratio, cash flow per share and dividend yield. The 
addition variables of the market performance can make the model describe better of the 
company performance.  
Last but not least, future researcher could make a comparative study based on the various 
sector in Malaysia and year. Different sector may have different effect of cooperate 
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